Blockchains such as bitcoin rely on reaching global consensus for the distributed ledger, and suffer from a well know scalability problem. We propose an algorithm which can avoid double spending in the short term with just O(√n) messages, relying on the fact that the velocity of money in the real world has coins generally circulating through at most a few wallets per day. The algorithm should be practical to avoid double spending with arbitrarily high probability, while feasibly coping with all the commerce in the world. This k-root-n algorithm is less effective in the long term once money circulates through a significant proportion of the world's wallets, and should therefore be used as a complement to a global consensus. Thus, global consensus can be reached periodically and with a considerable lag, while money can be safely spent with quick transactions in-between.
Introduction
In blockchains such as bitcoin, all n nodes reach Nakamoto Consensus (Nakamoto, 2009 ) on each block of transactions creating a scalability problem (Network, 2019) which famously limits the entire bitcoin network to a few transactions per second while consuming massive power. Nakamoto Consensus takes O(n) communication messages which limits its scale, although is already a huge improvement on traditional consensus algorithms like Paxos (Lamport, 1998 ) which take at least O(n 2 ) messages.
In practice, bitcoin transactions suffers from a lag time of between 15 minutes to several hours before being included in a block on the bitcoin blockchain (this lag time partly depending on how high a fee is paid), then an hour longer more to reach the commonly desired threshold of six block confirmation. Thus, there is a several hour latencies before received bitcoins can be respent.
At the time of writing the typical fee paid to the miner for a single Bitcoin transaction is tens of thousands of Satoshis or about $0.50 -$5, more expensive and slower than most domestic bank transactions.
We propose a scalable low-latency solution which can run in parallel to a global consensus mechanism such as blockchain, protecting against double spending in the short-term, while the n nodes reach consensus on transactions with a lag of some hours from the transaction time. With this algorithm we can also accept a situation where consensus is achieved infrequently (e.g. we could accept longer blocks which are created every hour, or every few hours rather than bitcoin's average of 10 minutes). The consensus itself could be the bitcoin blockchain or another blockchain or other consensus blockchain algorithms such as SCP (Loi Luu, 2015) or a traditional algorithm like PBFT (Liskov, 1999) .
For example, each morning the nodes may reach consensus on the valid transaction histories and wallet balances as of the preceding midnight GMT, and they may do so asynchronously, reaching the consensus by say 6am the next morning. Or in bitcoin terms we assume that a transaction is processed and verified within 6 hours and we take the chain up to the 6-th last block as known at 6am as a final record of all transactions dated up to the midnight before.
This timing with a 24-hour cycle and 6-hour lag is just a useful example. The purpose of the algorithm is that global consensus on transactions may only be reached periodically and with a considerable lag from the transaction time, and in the meantime we propose a solution to allow people to trade (in particular to pass on received coins safely) with next to zero latency.
We introduce a probabilistic algorithm called k-root-n which can avoid double-spending in the short to medium term, while there is no global consensus on the ledger, with arbitrarily high probability of detecting double spend, with just O(√n) messages per transaction. This is under the realistic assumption that specific money balances only circulate through O(constant) nodes in a 24-hour period. This assumption is realistic as in the real economy money circulates with a velocity measured in transactions per year and bitcoin is constrained by lag times to circulating a few times per day and in practice much more rarely on average.
In this algorithm the transactions are not off-chain and not limited to finite subset of user as in other solutions like the Lightning Network (Dryja, 2019) . Every transaction can be on-chain. But the transaction verification is low latency allowing transactions to continue off-chain while waiting for the blockchain to catch up. And the algorithm only involves O(√n) nodes, typically we will assume that we pick a number of verification messages around 10√n.
To see how well the k-root-n algorithm scales, assume n=10 billion people (the projected world population for 2050 and much more than bitcoin's current 32m wallets) transacting each on average once an hour 24-hours per day (higher than the average rate of commerce). Each transaction will involve messages to 10√n=1 million nodes. We will see that this gives a probability of p≈10 -9 of getting away with double spending even if half the nodes are fraudulent and 10% of the nodes are unavailable (i.e. 4.5√n honest nodes validating). So, each transaction only burdens 1 out of 10,000 nodes and with 10 billion transactions per hour globally, or 2.77million transactions per second globally, each node has to be involved in 278 transactions per second which is feasible for a modern computer. Thus, it seems practical that this algorithm could securely cope not only with Visa/Mastercard volumes but in fact with all the commerce in today's world and in the foreseeable future.
Basic idea of √n random double spending detection
We assume for now that every wallet is also a node which is online and provides basic verification services to the network. The basic idea is that any honest node that want to make sure the funds they received have not been double spent, will query k√n random nodes and share with each of them the transaction history (since the last global consensus) of the person sending them funds. Here k is a small number greater than 1, we generally recommend and assume k=10 for an effective k=4.5 after deducting 10% non-respondent nodes and up to 50% fraudulent nodes.
The communication with k√n random nodes can be directly or preferably cascading the query through a smaller number of nodes in a simple tree to avoid network bottlenecks of one node making k√n networks calls at the same instant.
On average for any two honest nodes receiving a payment there will be an average of k 2 common nodes queried by both, any one of which can detect double spending and raise the alarm. To see this, the first honest node queried randomly k√n nodes which is a proportion k/√n of all n nodes. So, when the second honest node queries k√n random nodes, on average a proportion of k√n * (k/√n) = k2 will overlap.
Choosing say k=4.5 is sufficient that there are on average 25 common honest responsive nodes and we will see that there is only a probability of ~10 -9 of zero common honest responsive nodes and therefore the chances of getting away with double spending are negligible. Also, the penalty for double spending is at least the minimum stake so if each wallet has a minimum stake m of $1, and each transaction is limited to well under $1 billion, say to a maximum M=$1,000,000, there is no expected benefit of double spending.
Critically though, a dishonest node may not be checking their inbound transactions. Therefore, the honest nodes need to check not only the transaction history of their immediate sender for forking/double spending, but also to recursively check any of sender's sender's, in any case that the immediate sender is relying on the sender's sender (etc.) to have balance to cover the current transaction. That is, the receiver will treat any inbound transaction (since the last global consensus of the network) as suspicious and if it is critical to providing cover for this transaction it will be recursively validated before the transaction is accepted.
There is an assumption here that each wallet must function as a node, must be online most of the time, and that each wallet has a minimum balance m (proof of stake threshold) so that there is always something to be lost by fraud, while every transaction has some maximum M so there is a limit on what can be gained by a single fraudulent transaction. It is also recommended that each wallet has a maximum balance (which could be simply m+M) so that it will not be possible to gain a high proportion of the wallets with an infinitesimally small proportion of the wealth.
And again, there is an assumption that the entire network reaches consensus on all transactions periodically e.g. with Blockchain (e.g. every 24 hours and with some hours of latency). This protocol provides performant transaction security in-between, while the participants must trust that any valid transaction will eventually make its way into the main blockchain or other main consensus algorithm which is the only long term record of transactions. The reason for this is that over a long time this k-root-n algorithm will slow down as money circulates through many nodes and the recursive checking becomes expensive.
Example
During Monday morning the network eventually reaches consensus that as of Sunday midnight the balances after all transactions were Chuck (malicious) $100 Mallory (malicious) $100
At that time there were a total of n valid wallets each of which with a minimum stake of m=$1.
We analyze this scenario where Chuck conspires with Mallory to double spend by giving the same money to Alice directly and to Bob via Mallory in an effort to conceal the double spend.
1. Mallory gives $99 to Bob (in exchange for some goods or services). Mallory declares her transaction history from the last consensus, which is empty, so she has $99 to spare. Bob first confirms Mallory had $100 as of the last consensus. Bob being honest then queries k√n network nodes (either directly or through a cascading tree) to confirm that none of them have heard of Mallory doing any other transactions since consensus. They have not. Bob accepts the $99 and they both digitally sign the transaction and submit it for eventual inclusion on the main distributed ledger. 2. Chuck gives $99 to Mallory. Mallory being malicious and complicit with Chuck tells no one about this transaction. They both sign the transaction and may or may not submit it to the main ledger. Chuck is passing this $99 through Mallory attempting to mask the double spending he is planning. He might potentially pass this money through further nodes. 3. Chuck now gives $99 to Alice. This is a fraudulent double spend. He tells Alice fraudulently that he has no other transactions since the last consensus. Alice being honest queries k√n network nodes. They all tell Alice that they are not aware of any forked transaction histories (since transaction #2 was not broadcast) for Chuck, and so Alice accepts the payment. ○ Bob notices that Mallory has $100 but only when depending on money from Chuck (transaction #2). Bob will therefore want to validate transaction #2 and will require Mallory to provide Chuck's transaction history. (Further in case Chuck in turn was relying on incoming transactions for his balance in transaction #2, which is not the case here, Bob would recursively ask for sender's sender's sender's transaction history until he has a transaction history for every transaction which is needed to justify Mallory's balance sufficiently to cover the current transaction). ○ Chuck now queries k√n random network nodes providing both Mallory's and Chuck transaction history (and any other recursively requested history). ○ Some of these nodes (k 2 on average but at least 1 with an incredibly high probability) had previously been told about Chuck's alternative transaction history #3 where he give $99 to Alice. They raise the alarm of double spending and broadcast a fraud proof. The proof of fraud is two different histories both signed by Chuck. ○ Bob rejects the transaction. ○ Since Alice had reported her transaction we can assume that Mallory is malicious.
Mallory and Chuck have their wallets blacklisted and both forfeit their $1 minimum stake. ○ As an extra recommended step, Alice and Bob might compare notes and find all the common nodes they had consulted and make sure none of them failed to report the double spending. If they did that node should also be blacklisted for fraud, with proof of fraud showing that the node received two alternative histories of Alice and in both cases approved them (such approvals being signed by the node evidencing the fraud).
The next morning (or after some hours of lag time on a sliding scale) consensus is established again around the following balances:
End balances
Chuck (malicious) $1 (blacklisted with balance forfeited) Mallory (malicious) $1 (blacklisted with balance forfeited)
Once this consensus is reached, future senders need only provide shorter transaction histories back to the newer consensus.
Uptime
There is a need for honest nodes to be online most of the time. It is recommended to have a protocol where an honest node commits to a Service Level Agreement (SLA) of say 90% uptime and a node which doesn't comply may receive warnings and eventually financial penalties or disqualification by consensus of all nodes.
Technical details Variables
• n Number of valid nodes as of last consensus • k A number >1 where we choose a convention of querying k√n nodes for validation • k "Effective k" which is khu • m Minimum allowed wallet transactions, typically $1 • M Maximum allowed transaction (where preferably the maximum wallet balance is also M+m) • h Proportion of nodes assumed to be honest. Typically, assumed to be at least 50%. The algorithm can work with less but the underlying Blockchain probably can't.
• u Proportion of uptime required from nodes, typically 90%
• v The maximum number of inbound transactions a node commonly participates in during the time period between consensus (or more accurately only the inbound transactions which the node depends on for a subsequent spend) • w The maximum number of nodes a specific balance of coin commonly circulates through in time period between consensus (where it is only considered circulation of the nth transaction was dependent for its balance on the (n-1)th). w is generally assumed to be small e.g. around 2. It is related to the economics concept of the velocity of money but defined more narrowly.
Glossary
• Node/wallet -a computing device that represents the interests of a User acting as their digital wallet storing their public and private key, transactions and balances, and executing their Transactions with other wallets. Also acts as a Node in the network providing validation services to the rest of the network by storing various Transaction Lineages it has seen for other users and raising the alarm if a forked Transaction Lineage is spotted.
• User a human or other legal Person such as a company who owns a Wallet.
• Transaction A Transaction t is an agreement between two User's Wallets to transfer a specific amount of money from one Wallet called the Sender S [t] to the other called the Receiver R [t] with at a minimum the timestamp, amount, and digital signatures of both Wallets.
• Consensus Checkpoint -a periodic (e.g. daily at midnight) checkpoint where all honest nodes reach universal agreement on the transaction histories of all wallets as of that given time and therefore also of the Balances of all Wallets at that time, although the time at which the Global Consensus is Achieved may be some time (e.g. a few hours) later due to the network time involved in running the consensus algorithm.
• Consensus Latency Is the lag time from the time for which Global Consensus is achieved, and the time at which consensus is achieved (e.g. in our examples 6 hours from midnight to 6am each day) • Transaction History A chronologically ordered list with all transactions for a certain user u from the previous Consensus Checkpoint up to some point in time.
• Lineage (LIN[t] This gives a list of all the transactions which ultimately t depends on in the sense that if any one of those is invalidated the transaction t won't be covered (whereas any other transaction in the entire system since the last Global Consensus can be invalidated without invalidating t).
• Validating a Transaction Lineage LIN[t] Involves checking that S[t] has signed LIN[t] and
that all the transactions t1 in LIN[t] are properly formed and signed and then checking with k√n random nodes that they have not seen any alternative transaction histories from S[t].
• Transaction Receiver Due Diligence The checks an honest Node will perform before Receiving and signing a new Transaction t. While this recursive check may add overhead, in 24 hours a real currency will only change hands at most a handful of times (in fact a typical velocity of real money is changing hands order of magnitude once per month) and therefore this overhead is small. That's why this k-root-n method of preventing double spending is not practical for the long term and it's critical to use this technique only for some hours or days, but eventually as money changes hands many times this algorithm will slow down and it's then important to reach a global consensus and reset the transaction histories.
Thus the message size is bounded by (and probably much less) than O(v w ) where v is the number of inbound transactions a node participates in the time period between consensus (or more accurately only the inbound transactions which the node depends on for a subsequent spend), and w is the number of nodes a specific balance circulates through in the same time period, again only to the extent that it is relied on for a spend. In practice w is likely to be mostly ≤2. v can occasionally be bigger, in the case of a merchant who receives many small payments and then uses the aggregate balance to pay a supplier all in the same cycle. Still in most transactions, payers will have balance to cover their spend as of the last global consensus and there will be no need to recursively validate their inbound transactions at all. So most message sizes will have a reasonable bound measured in say tens of kilobytes including at most a few dozen recursive transactions.
Security and choice of k
We may compute the probability of zero clashes (common nodes) between two random sets of r=k√n nodes to be: By substitution we can see that k=4.5 gives p~10 -9 for all large n and for convenience we therefore typically assume k=4.5 then k=10 to allow for 10% unavailable nodes and 50% fraudulent nodes.
The probability of exactly c clashes can be written as ( , ) = ( )( − ) ( ) Note that even if 51% or more of nodes are dishonest, the system can still work. For example, if k=6 and 51% or so of nodes are dishonest we have an effective k=3 which still gives p≈0.00012 for sizeable n and of course we can always pick a higher k. However, the Global Consensus algorithm is likely going to fail with 51% dishonest nodes.
In general k= ℎ √ is the expected number of honest nodes who will respond to a verification request where u is the proportion of uptime of honest nodes. Therefore, if m is the wallet minimum (and therefore the minimum penalty for being caught in a double spend), M is the wallet maximum and therefore the maximum gain from a double spend we have 0 ( , ℎ √ ) − (1 − 0 ( , ℎ √ )) ≈ 0 ( , ℎ √ ) − is the expected payoff from a double spend attempt.
W must design our network so that / > 0 ( , ℎ √ ). p0 is not sensitive to n (above a certain number) so typical practical numbers which satisfy the above with a couple of orders of magnitude to spare would be k=10, h>0.5, u=0.9, k=4.5, 0 ( , 4 .5) ≈ (1.5)10 −9 and therefore we might choose m=$1, M=$100 million.
